Jason's Memorandum of Law for his case

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF COLORADO


Civil Action No.: 008-CV-01235-ZLW
JASON PECCI, Applicant,

v.

WARDEN BCCF, and THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Respondents.


MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF HABEAS CORPUS



This document presents legal questions at issue in Federal Dist. of Colorado Habeas Corpus case no., 08-CV-01235-ZLW, as known to pro-se petitioner Jason Pecci. This outline needs development by an experienced defense attorney to cogently bring forth the Constitutional defects claimed.















TABLE OF CONTENTS
Legal Question
- application of post conviction review standards
Background
- Plea, Sentence
- State Post Conviction Actions
- Eighth Judicial District
- Colorado Court of Appeal
-Habeas Corpus / Unexhausted Issues, Request for Discovery, Affidavits of Truth
Standard of Review
De Novo Standard Where Facts Absent
Standards, Facts and Logic
- Logical Failures In Terms of Syllogism
- False Premise (Undefined Antecedent)
- False Assumption (Connection of Petitioner To Antecedent Condition)
First Failure (District Court)
- Plea
- Investigation
Second Failure (Appellate Court)
-Invalid Fact, Vacuous Application of Law
Conclusion











Preamble

A Memorandum Of Law In Support of a habeas corpus is required to bring forth the relevant questions necessary to answer the question of granting the writ. This Memo presents a hierarchy of unique precursor questions regarding defense counsel, post-conviction counsel and the former presiding judge.

If the counter-productive behavior of trial counsel, culminating in a “regret list” she discussed with the petitioner post-sentencing, is properly questioned…

e.g. Why was the range in a gun related offense never determined?
Why was the court misled regarding both circumstances and mens rea?


If the obstructed course post-conviction counsel had to travel to “pre-programmed failure” is properly questioned…

e.g. Knowing a record alone is generally insufficient to prove ineffective assistance
of counsel; why were trial counsel and her supervisor not deposed?


If the obstruction by the former judge regarding evidence, in light of his national infamy and censure regarding evidentiary obfuscation / sequestration / malfeasance, is properly questioned…

e.g. Why was an evidentiary hearing avoided in conflict with the intent of state
post-conviction rule 35 ( c )?


As the following Memorandum encourages this Court to do the question as to granting an evidentiary hearing, and subsequently the Writ, will be “yes.”

Please indulge these questions, as presented below, so that an initial fact based answer can be established.




Legal Question
The matter currently before the Court is; did the Colorado State Courts evaluate post-conviction claims in a manner that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 28 USC §2254(d)(1) or reach conclusions based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).

Also, the inapplicability of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) to deny an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Circuit precedent, in further question of the determination of facts.

The question will bring forth the Sixth, Fifth and Fourteenth Constitutional Amendment questions underpinning the attendant Application for Writ of habeas Corpus.

The analysis of the prevailing legal question of State Court post-conviction rulings, and seminal Constitutional failings is generally governed by Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000)

That clearly established Federal law is the Strickland and Cronic standards of ineffective assistance of counsel, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), respectively. Also, the attendant breaches of fifth and fourteenth amendment expectations of due process via acts of deficient counsel need to be addressed. The analysis of this legal question also is governed by Williams v. Taylor, (ibid.).

Anatomy of the Question
Arguments against Strickland and other controlling standards have reached incorrect conclusions by two avenues of illogic - either false assumption or no connection of Petitioner’s claim to the antecedent. Later deficiencies are grounded in the latter form of faulty syllogism; no connection of the claim to the antecedent.

Valid form: If antecedent condition then consequent result.
Petitioner met / fell below antecedent condition.
Therefore petitioner achieved / failed consequent result.

To avoid policy application to any specific claim the opposition places excessive emphasis on the antecedent condition the Petitioner must meet to support their claim then concludes, without analysis, the Petitioner failed to meet the condition(s). It is as if; rote recitation of standards obviates the need to analyze the elements of the claim as com-pared to the antecedent conditions - the middle of the syllogism – thereby ensuring the Petitioner fails. This is analogous to saying; charged with offense equals guilty of offense because the prosecutor can cite statutes and precedent and ignore discovery, legal analysis and trial; deeming this unnecessary – law effectively divorced from reality.

Earlier, seminal, deficiencies are grounded in the former form of faulty logic; false assumption. The valid form of syllogism may have been employed but the antecedent was invalid. This enabled fabrication of faux fact that was accepted as real fact by Colorado A.G. and Appellate Court, and this constitutes the most immediate standard of ineffective assistance per Cronic (U.S. v. Chronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (see above / Legal Question).



Background
Under specious representation of public defender Kathryn Hay (Co. Bar #20817) Petitioner plead to murder in the second degree and was sentenced to 48 years. State public defender Martin Gerra (Co. Bar #9740) filed a cursory appeal questioning the judge's (now nationally infamous for corrupt practices re: evidence, see below fn’s 3,4) discretion in that a maximum sentence implied lack of consideration (fn1) of mitigating circumstances. Petitioner’s family retained counsel for post-conviction representation. Barrett Weisz (Co. Bar #27601) filed a C.R.Crim.P. 35(b) sentence reconsideration then a Rule 35(c) claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The District Court denied access to evidence and denied an evidentiary hearing upon the potential discovery of that evidence.

Petitioner appealed pro-se and filed an opening brief. Post conviction counsel resumed representation and filed a superseding opening brief. The appeal was denied upon continuing ignorance of the circumstances (see above fn l). Petitioner filed a Petition for Rehearing explaining the percolation of all the false premises from the Dist. Court, as perpetuated by the lack of an evidentiary hearing. That court deigned response. Cert. to Co. S. Ct., based on the unanswered rehearing petition was denied. Pro-se Habeas Corpus was filed May 19, 2008. The State’s pre-answer identified unexhausted issues that Petitioner contends are excusable under "cause and prejudice" standard. Petitioner attempted an improvident interlocutory appeal (fn2) and withdrew upon information that denial of unexhausted issues is not a "final, appealable order". Petitioner filed a subsequent C.R.Crim.P. 35(c) petition in the Colo. Eighth Dist.

Petitioner presented all the unexhausted issues in their context of having arisen post-conviction, and being attributable to deficient performance of post-conviction counsel. The original judge, Terrance Gilmore, recused himself per petitioner’s request. The petitioner felt the judge’s evidentiary malfeasance as the lead prosecutor (fn3) of Tim Masters (fn4), carried forward into his oath as a judge. Judge D. Williams was appointed but he was unable to distinguish the unexhausted claims as temporally and personally distinct from the Petition that presented the exhausted issues. He summarily dismissed the Petition as duplicative. Petitioner filed a Request for Rehearing to make the distinction and was denied. This denial held the same indifference to the actual claim. The appeal procedurally defaulted due to a similar misunderstanding of "final, appealable order" above.

Petitioner then attempted deposition or interrogatory discovery and submission of Affidavits of Truth from his parents to inform the habeas claims, where a record on its face cannot. Discovery and the Affidavits were denied. The State requested summary dismissal based upon the willful ignorance of all the circumstances that have, through repetition, ascended from convenient self-delusion at the State district to a universal lie that a discerning jurist has yet to confront.

Standard of Review
There are no properly determined facts to defer to therefore a de novo review is required to determine fact. Only then can the facts be evaluated as relevant to Habeas Corpus law. (See petitioner's Request for Rehearing, Co. App. Ct. 05CA2168; above discussion of "false presumption" creating "faux fact".)

Standards, Facts, and Logic
Cronic, in context of sixth amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims, addresses the failure of representation of such a magnitude that a prejudicial result of any legal process is presumed - per se prejudice. It acts as a bootstrap short circuit of prejudice analysis of an ineffective representation claim, where the first prong of Strickland is so blatant and obvious that only a prejudicial outcome could result. E.g.; counsel plants aggravated faux fact in lieu of investigation and discovery. In a Strickland analysis Cronic is controlling when the discovered failures of representation are so far below expectation of competence as to constitute abandonment.

Petitioner’s position is that counsel executed deceit, to cover up abandonment in all of the proceedings after preliminary hearing and that abandonment constitutes more than ineffective assistance of counsel - perhaps destructive assistance of counsel - meeting Cronic’s standard of obvious failure.

Presuming prejudice per Cronic, as discussed in Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 717, it makes sense when counsel has entirely failed to function as an adversary for three reasons:
1) undermines Strickland's assumption that counsel "made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment" 466 U.S. at 690
2) Strickland inquiry impotent when counsel abdicates role as advocate because the abdication results in defective record re: evaluation of prejudice defendant suffered.
3) adversarial failure renders "likelihood that the verdict is unreliable" to be "so high that a case-by-case inquiry is unnecessary," Mickens v. Taylor, 152 L. Ed.2d 291

First Failure
The first improper plea application of Strickland, or application of Strickland where Cronic was sufficient, occurred upon state district's impediment of post-conviction counsel's C.R.Crim.P 35(c) petition and the denial premised upon those induced handicaps. That Court committed the following errors to protect the faux facts, as destructively established by deceptive trial counsel. Their position was a three part syllogism:

A properly counseled plea is voluntary, knowing and intelligent. Defendant was properly counseled.
Defendant accepted plea voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1970) states; in pertinent part regarding plea acceptance and discovery:

“The defendant and his counsel must make their best judgment as to the weight of the State's case. Counsel must predict how the facts, as he understands them, would be viewed by a court. If proved, would those facts convince a judge or jury of the defendant's guilt? On those facts would evidence seized without a warrant be admissible? Would the trier of fact on those facts find a confession voluntary and admissible?” “…a decision to plead guilty must necessarily rest upon counsel's answers.”

Obviously, without discovery of facts, or discussion with client, counsel can not and could not answer these requirements or validly evaluate and recommend a plea.

On the grounds of failure to investigate and an un-counseled plea, an evidentiary hearing could have proven ineffective assistance per Strickland or Cronic. Only through unreasonable application of Strickland, or specious evaluation of prejudice where Cronic applied, was the Eighth District able to rationalize that petitioner received assistance of counsel consistent with Constitutional expectations, 28 USC § 2554 ( d) ( 1) and (2).

The Court's position re: counsel's lack of investigation was denial and obstruction of countervailing evidence:

Adequately investigated defenses based on discovered evidence imply adequate representation.
Counsel adequately investigated potential defenses.
Defendant received competent representation (re: investigation)

The connection of petitioner to the antecedent - the middle of this syllogism - is entirely premised on a single incidental phrase noted on one page of counsel's notes, from an initial interview: "heat of passion." She followed this with verbal communication to petitioner's family that mitigating circumstances existed and she could explore viable defenses after discovery. (Affidavits of Truth from petitioner's parents on this matter have been rejected by this Court, see above Background) We still await this discovery and the conclusions it proves.

A proper application of Federal Law may state:

Only, 1.) three obiter dictum/scribum words, and 2.) a verbal expression of intent to execute discovery in pursuit of viable defen¬ses; falls short of adequate representation and constitutes ipso facto prejudice. (re: investigation)
Defendant received no more than 1.) and 2.) above in pursuit of viable defenses.
Defendant's representation was deficient and per se prejudicial. (Cronic) (re: investigation)

The failures of evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel regarding a plea disposition (Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52) resulted in a decision contrary to that precedent, § 2254(d)(1), ascribed to factual failures, § 2254(d)(2), perpetrated by deceitful counsel.

To reach a conclusion consistent with Hill, as to the attorney’s obligation to enable client to make a fully informed and voluntary decision regarding the prosecution's plea offer (Hill at 62) a Court has to evaluate composite failures of representation executed to ram through the plea in opposition to legitimacy. The manifold failures of misrepresentation, not properly considered, are: Counsel,
1.) did not provide legal definition of "knowingly" (a critical element of the offense, Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249 at 1254-5),
2.) did not recommend plea consistent with McMann v. Richardson, (see above; this section) (plea was proxy recommended by uninformed head Public Defender),
3.) did not counsel defendant through plea contract (contract was proxy counseled by investigator who could not answer questions re: fifth amendment waiver),
4.) did make a pre-emptive false statement at plea colloquy that defendant was sufficiently counseled; resulting in defendant trying to comply with contradictory mandates of not discussing the facts of the case (counsel's advice to that point due to fifth amendment waiver insufficiency) and the court's expectation of disclosure for a properly counseled plea agreement.

These failures are substantively addressed in Petitioner's Pro-se Opening Brief and Petition for Rehearing to the Colorado Court of Appeals (CCofA). The majority of aspects of this amalgam of failures have been excluded from consideration as unexhausted by the state courts. Petitioner contends this exclusion is unwarranted. These deceits against the client and Court in the plea process established a beachhead for the cover-up of her abandonment of the defendant which occurred soon after the preliminary hearing; at which time she stopped investigation and discovery. The cumulative failure is addressed in both Petitioner’s pro-se Opening Brief and Petition for Rehearing to the CC of A.

Pro-se Opening Brief (Co. App. Ct. 05CA2168; superseded by return of representation by Attorney B. Weisz) directly confronted the lack of counseling of the plea, attendance to the plea contract by counsel and under¬standing of 5th amendment waiver by defendant. (This is at issue in the instant habeas where handicapping by trial court and occurrences of ineffective assistance by post-conviction counsel constitute issues temporally impossible to present to state appellate courts and permissible under "cause and prejudice" exemption.) This is further confronted in the pro-se Petition for Rehearing. No counter argument of how, if properly exposed at an evidentiary hearing, this would not constitute: inchoate and malformed plea, violation of due process, and ineffective assistance of counsel per Cronic (the a priori sabotage of plea contract and violation of due process being the per se prejudice). Thus:

1.) An un-counseled plea where, 2.) Constitutional questions still exist; cannot be voluntary, knowing or intelligent.

Evidence exists that defendant was un-counseled and had unanswered Constitutional questions.
If this evidence is proven accurate at an evidentiary hearing defendant's plea was not voluntary, knowing nor intelligent.


First Failure Summary
An analysis of compliance with application of clearly established Federal Law or an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented, first hinges on the second component of fact determination. That determination must be “at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case.” Hennon v. Cooper , 109 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus failure to investigate and an un-counseled plea are such facts not properly determined and that an evidentiary hearing could have properly exposed, to prove ineffective assistance per Strickland or Cronic. Only through fact avoidance (patently unreasonable determination of facts), then an unreasonable application of Strickland, or specious evaluation of prejudice where Cronic applied, was the Eighth District able to rationalize that Petitioner received assistance of counsel, conviction or sentence consistent with Constitutional expectations of representation or due process.

Second Failure
An appeal to the Colorado Court of Appeals (CCofA) attempted to bring forth the trial court's poor reliance on fact and misapplication of law in denying an evidentiary hearing. A hearing could have resolved all the false premises the CCofA cited to affirm the trial court's creation of said false premises. This is a direct analogous result of the paradox imposed by the trial court, to deny need for an evidentiary hearing. The trial court sequestered evidence by the below circular rationale:

Request for hearing to prove fact X
Provide proof fact X exists to warrant a hearing

The CCofA received and reiterated this paradigm by deferring to the trial court's assertion that some alternative to fact X existed, (that alternative being false assertion Y) - and imputing legal rigor to the trial court upon that false premise.
Petitioner had to prove X for a hearing
CCofA defers to unsupported alternative Y to deny proof of X

The standard for granting an evidentiary hearing, to break the deadlock attributed to the trial court above, is most simply:

If allegations set forth proper grounds for relief the court must grant a prompt hearing. Patterson v. Hampton, 355 F.2d 470 (10th Cir., 1966)

This is followed in regard to state post-conviction matters by Roberts v. People, 404 P.2d 848 (1965), (“must be given opportunity to support allegations with evidence presented at a hearing") and obversely by People v. Breaman, 924 P.2d 1139 (Co.App. 1996) ("hearing denied only if allegations are without merit and do not warrant post-conviction relief")

Obviously the allegations were meritorious and required factual development. (See Affidavit submitted by former head public defender in that trial district, Joseph A. Gaveldon (#7282), in support of the post-conviction claims.) Evasion of an evidentiary hearing to develop fact at the district level crippled the CCofA's ability to evaluate an appeal on the application of law warranting an evidentiary hearing regarding allegations in support of a Hill v. Lockhart or Cronic claim. Each specific misapprehension is tersely addressed in petitioner's pro-se Petition For Rehearing (fn5) to the CCofA as: Lies ## 1,2,3A,3B,4,5,6,7,8,9 and Contradictions ## 1,2 (denoted as false assertions "Y" in above circular logic depiction).

Once each false premise addressed as a lie or contradiction (fn6) is corrected; an evaluation on those corrected premises would trigger the rule to break the imposed paradox deadlock with an evidentiary hearing and validate the claims in the trial court. Thus a critical evaluation by the CCofA, in light of false premises, would have followed syllogistically as:

Deficiencies in evidence require an evidentiary hearing to properly conduct a Hill v. Lockhart/Strickland/Cronic analysis.

Deficiencies exist on the premises used to deny the appeal.

An evidentiary hearing is required to properly evaluate the claims in the District Court.

Need for an Evidentiary Hearing
The Circuit Court has held that where "a habeas petitioner has diligently sought to develop the factual basis underlying his habeas petition, but a state court has prevented him from doing so, §2254(e)(2) restrictions on the granting of a hearing does not apply." Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998)(in harmony with 3rd, 4th,5th,7th and 9th Cir. decisions; citations omitted), deriving from Nguyen v. Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1359 (10th Cir. 1997)("presumption of correctness does not apply if the habeas petitioner did not receive a full, fair and adequate hearing in the state court proceeding on the matter sought to be raised in the habeas petition.")

A hearing could still be denied if the allegations are contravened by the existing factual record, Medina, 71 F.3d at 368-9. Because the state courts did not hold any evidentiary hearing this Court is in the same disabled position to evaluate the factual record, (Miller at 1254). Petitioner further asserts the need to originally develop a proper record because it is devoid of correct fact of: 1.) the circumstances of the offense and 2.) the relationship between plea counsel and client. This augments the argument for a de novo review to expose factual deficiencies of the record and grant an evidentiary hearing to rebut presumption of factual correctness, § 2254(e)(1). (see above, Standard of Review ("No properly determined facts to refer to."))

Substantive aspects of plea insufficiency not addressed by post-conviction counsel merit consideration because: they would have been, 1.) discovered had a proper evidentiary hearing been held and 2.) developed had post-conviction counsel not been procedurally handicapped and rendered ineffective. (fn7)


This introduces the causal question as to whether an evidentiary hearing would answer the "good cause" question (Habeas Rule 6, Bracey v. Grambley, 520 U.S. 899) re: discovery, or if "good cause" exists to conduct discovery to more fully inform an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner proffers that the latter scenario is the logically correct one. Discovery was avoided and procedurally subverted in the state courts to preserve the aggrandized faux facts generated by deceptive counsel and elaborated by district and appellate courts in post-conviction process. The record is not informative of this compounding failure sequence and requires discovery of correct fact. These failures in representation by counsel, her supervisor, and post-conviction counsel and the resulting ‘fact prejudice’ is best presented to the habeas court by discovery effected under habeas Rule 6, § 2254 Rule 6(a), to bring these cognizable matters into the record.

Rule 6 exists to aid the court "in developing fact necessary to decide whether to order an evidentiary hearing or to grant the writ following an evidentiary hearing." (Rule 6 Advisory Committee Notes)

Rule 6(a) requires the habeas judge find "good cause" to authorize any discovery via Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner asserts good cause exists to: 1.) initially discover critical facts of the offense and interactions between counsel, client and court; and 2.) dis¬cover motivations of judge to sequester evidence, and counsel to avoid initial analysis of evidence.

Without discovery to effectively inform an evidentiary hearing this court faces the same disability as the CCofA in confronting facts absent due to ineffective and procedurally disabled post-conviction counsel, (See non-duplicative Petition For Post Conviction Relief Pursuant to C.R.Crim.P. 35(c)(Colo. 8th Dist. 2008)) and faux fact as fabricated by plea counsel. Reliance upon an inherently incomplete record, regarding matters of ineffectiveness, will produce the same erroneous results that this habeas court is situated to correct, Agan v. Dugger, 853 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 1987), reflecting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, (See Petitioner's Request For Discovery Pursuant To Habeas Rule 6, and Amended Request For Discovery; latter offering illustrative example of how disparately naked an undeveloped record may be:

... deficiencies [in representation] are not manifest on the record. If so an excerpt may read e.g. "I have no ballistic data on this gun related crime, nor have I obtained discovery from the People, but consistent with clairvoyance and expedience I offer the unsupported range of four feet for the tactical reason of procuring a maximally unfounded sentence for my client.”

Grounds for this statement derive from counsel's recommendation, after sentencing, that range testing may benefit an appeal (See Attachment A; Plea counsel’s “regret list,” as mentioned in Preamble above). There is no tactical reason effective counsel would avoid such preparation pre-trial, then falsely propound a scenario and range contrary to all evidence and testimony.

One could apply this template to question the integrity of the plea and find, e.g.

Head Public Defender: "I recommended the plea for second degree murder; without knowledge of the circumstances of the offense, as described by defendant to my subordinate; for the tactical reason of avoiding discovery, pre-trial motions, trial and other tedious due process."
Plea Counsel: "I did not tell the defendant the legal definition of 'knowingly', nor counsel him through the plea con¬tract, and I lied to the court that I had, I also intimated after the plea that defendant could then discuss facts of his offense (still without mention of what a fifth amendment waiver is) and I withheld that I had assumed a scenario inconsistent with defendant's evidence and consistent facts for the tactical reason of avoiding any adversarial testing of a delusion that best supports the prosecution."

The record only raises question of the possibility of these hypotheses and requires discovery to clarify how diametric to Constitutionally effective representation these strategic deceptions are. Massaro v. U.S., 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1694 (2003).

Footnotes:
1 Willful ignorance of all circumstances is petitioner’s position
2 Petitioner had proceeded on literal translation – “during discussion” – assuming intra-process rulings are appealable.
3 Investigation revealed behavior for which the Attny. Reg. Counsel censured Judge Gilmore; his second.
4 Co. Eighth District. 98CR1149. Prosecutor bragged in A&E television feature of achieving conviction with non-probative evidence. False conviction reversed upon testing of hidden exculpatory evidence.
5 Petition included as attachment in previous briefs to this Court and not duplicitively included here.
6 Characterization of faux fact as percolated from State District to Appellate Courts.
7 A paradigmatic example of why habeas rules of discovery and expansion of record have been established to augment a deficient record. (See citation, Massaro v. U.S., 123 S. Ct. 1690 (2003) below.) Here a deposition of Mr. Weisz is the best and most concise procedure to elucidate the obstructions he encountered.





Conclusion
An evidentiary hearing, per expectation of Townsend v. Sain, 372 US 293 (as premise for Habeas Rule 8), can reveal all the elements of the State Courts' fact avoidance that deprived any ensuing application of Federal Law of legitimacy, § 2254 (d)(1) & (2) and constitutes clear and convincing rebuttal evidence to relieve this Court of the burden of reliance upon incorrect presumption as fact § 2254 (e)(1). There has not been, by pre-trial investigation, post-conviction evidentiary hearing, nor any other means, any substantive evidence disclosed to allow proper evaluation of the post-conviction claim, and upon which any application of law is vacuous ( § 2254 (d)(1)&(2)). Exposure of the injurious representation that caused these Constitutional deficiencies answers the prevailing legal question before this Court; that the State Courts met the criteria, multiply, for approval of the Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Respectfully Submitted,

Jason Pecci Dated:_______________________ #111132 BCCF / 8-P
11560 Rd. FF 75
Las Animas, CO 81054